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1991 
NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12 AND DOMESTIC OIL 
PIPELINES: AN INCOMPATIBLE RELATIONSHIP? 
Alexander S. Arkfeld* 
Abstract: As climate change’s momentum becomes increasingly more difficult to quell, 
environmentalists are litigating to stop oil pipeline expansion. Litigation over two recently 
completed oil pipelines—the Flanagan South and the Gulf Coast—illustrates the legal battle 
environmentalists face. Given the outcome of those cases, it may seem that environmentalists 
face insurmountable judicial precedent. But they are not out of options quite yet. 
Although no statute expressly requires the federal government to conduct environmental 
analysis of proposed domestic oil pipelines, two statutes—the Clean Water Act (CWA) and 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—generally work in tandem to require the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps or Corps) to complete an analysis when a proposed 
pipeline crosses regulated waters. However, the Army Corps recently has begun using a 
general permit called Nationwide Permit 12 (NWP 12) to streamline the approval process by 
avoiding individual review of pipelines. The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits upheld 
the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 in approving the Flanagan South and Gulf Coast pipelines, 
rejecting arguments that such use violates the CWA and NEPA. Not only did environmentalists 
lose both decisions, but the Army Corps also subsequently tightened its analysis to avoid 
potential future liability. 
Despite these setbacks, this Note contends that the battle is not yet over. The Note argues 
that the Army Corps failed to comply with the CWA’s plain meaning when it issued NWP 12, 
resulting in a limited opportunity for the public to participate. By limiting public comment, 
NWP 12 undermines the Corps’s ability to take a hard look at the environmental consequences 
of proposed oil pipelines. If the agency cannot comply with the CWA’s plain meaning, it can 
no longer use NWP 12 to avoid individual review of oil pipelines. Given recent judicial 
precedent, environmentalists face a difficult task. But hope remains. Under the framework first 
described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the circuit 
courts are improperly deferring to the Army Corps’s interpretation of the CWA when the 
statute’s meaning is clear. Judicial recognition and correction of this would be a victory for 
environmentalists, as it would increase federal environmental review of domestic oil pipelines 
and provide the public with a better opportunity to voice its concerns over the proliferation of 
oil pipelines in the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is an energy glutton. Despite accounting for less than 5% of 
the world’s population, the country consumes nearly 20% of the world’s 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2018. I would like to thank 
Professor Knudsen for her invaluable guidance and edits. I would also like to thank the phenomenal 
team at Washington Law Review for their outstanding editorial work.  
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energy supply1 and is the world’s largest consumer of oil.2 More than 2.5 
million miles of oil and natural gas pipeline help satiate the high demand,3 
and this number is increasing.4 As our opportunity to prevent climate 
change’s most dire consequences recedes like a coastline in rising tides,5 
environmentalists, in their fight against oil dependence, are fiercely 
opposing construction of new pipelines.6 In the courts, environmentalists 
have recently come up short.7 
To provide context to the statutory and regulatory requirements 
concerning federal oil pipeline review and approval,8 this Note examines 
two heavily litigated domestic oil pipelines: TransCanada’s Gulf Coast 
Pipeline (GC Pipeline) and Enbridge’s Flanagan South Pipeline (FS 
Pipeline). The GC Pipeline transports oil nearly 500 miles from Cushing, 
                                                     
1. Meg Jacobs, America’s Never-Ending Oil Consumption, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/american-oil-consumption/482532/ 
[http://perma.cc/YNH7-ME6G]; see also What Is the United States’ Share of World Energy 
Consumption?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=87&t=1 
[https://perma.cc/Z8HL-N7PP] (the United States’s share of world energy consumption is 18%). 
2. Alex Kuzoian, Animated Map Shows All the Major Oil and Gas Pipelines in the U.S., BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/map-major-us-oil-gas-energy-
pipelines-2015-12 [http://perma.cc/C5NC-3ZCR].  
3. Id. 
4. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Revive Dakota Access, Keystone XL 
Oil Pipelines, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-gives-green-light-to-dakota-access-keystone-xl-oil-pipelines/ 
?utm_term=.aa1f812e443c [http://perma.cc/4CS3-NHZL] (reporting on President Trump’s executive 
orders supporting the completion of the Dakota Access and Keystone XL oil pipelines). 
5. See generally Christiana Figueres et al., Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate, 546 NATURE 
593 (2017) (providing evidence that global leadership must make significant strides by 2020 to 
effectively combat climate change). 
6. See, e.g., Andrew M. Harris & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Keystone XL Pipeline Block Sought to Undo 
Trump’s Approval, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-03-30/keystone-xl-pipeline-comes-under-new-challenges-over-approval 
[http://perma.cc/L4AQ-EZZK] (reporting on environmental groups’ challenge to President Trump’s 
approval of the Keystone XL pipeline). 
7. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick (Bostick II), 787 F.3d 1043, 1061 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting 
environmentalists’ challenges to the Gulf Coast Pipeline). 
8. This Note focuses on domestic oil pipelines rather than transnational oil pipelines or natural gas 
pipelines. The federal approval process for domestic oil pipelines is less stringent than the approval 
process for natural gas pipelines. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must approve proposed 
natural gas pipelines, Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Army Corps II), 803 F.3d 31, 
50 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2015), subjecting the entire pipeline to environmental review, Del. Riverkeeper 
Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Domestic oil 
pipelines, on the other hand, do not require comparable federal approval and are thus not expressly 
subject to whole-pipeline review. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 50. Domestic oil pipelines also differ 
from transnational oil pipelines in that the Secretary of State must approve transnational pipelines. 
See id. at 33 (“The U.S. Secretary of State must approve oil pipelines that cross international 
borders . . . but that requirement is inapplicable to wholly domestic pipelines.”). 
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Oklahoma, to the Gulf Coast,9 crossing over 2000 regulated waters10 along 
its route.11 The nearly 600-mile-long FS Pipeline is designed to ship 
approximately 600,000 barrels of oil per day from Illinois to Cushing, 
Oklahoma, where the oil is then directed to the Gulf Coast.12 It, too, 
crosses roughly 2000 regulated waters.13 
Although no specific statute expressly subjects domestic oil pipelines 
to whole-pipeline review and approval, two statutes create a regulatory 
scheme that generally serves to subject entire pipelines crossing regulated 
waters to review and approval.14 The Clean Water Act15 (CWA) requires 
the federal government to issue a permit for each segment of pipeline that 
crosses regulated waters.16 This, in turn, triggers the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 196917 (NEPA), a federal statute that 
subjects federally issued permits to environmental review.18 An important 
aspect of environmental review under NEPA is its public-comment 
mandate, which serves to assist the federal government in making 
informed decisions.19 Environmental review of CWA permits is not 
limited to the permit itself but must also include the permit’s foreseeable 
effects—the completion of an oil pipeline, for example.20 However, the 
Army Corps has evaded individualized environmental review by using 
Nationwide Permit 12 (NWP 12)—a type of CWA permit that approves 
all projects falling within its scope—as a tool to approve domestic oil 
pipelines.21 The Tenth and District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuits upheld 
this use of NWP 12 despite CWA and NEPA challenges brought by 
environmental groups.22 
                                                     
9. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick (Bostick I), 539 F. App’x 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2013). 
10. The Army Corps has jurisdiction over “all waters of the United States.” Ohio Valley Envtl. 
Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I), 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454–55 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). This Note refers to waters within the Corps’s jurisdiction as 
“regulated waters.” 
11. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1046. 
12. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 35. 
13. Id. at 33–34, 52. 
14. See, e.g., id. at 33 (“[n]otwithstanding the absence of any general permitting requirement for 
domestic oil pipelines,” the Clean Water Act often triggers environmental review under NEPA). 
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
16. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38. 
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012). 
18. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 36. 
19. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–69 (2004). 
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2016) (defining “cumulative impact” under NEPA as the “incremental 
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions”). 
21. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38–40; Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (10th Cir. 2015). 
22. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 34–35; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061. 
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Part I of this Note introduces the CWA and NEPA, explaining how the 
two statutes can work in tandem to provide a regulatory scheme over oil 
pipelines where none might otherwise exist. It also explains the concept 
of general permitting. Part II first introduces NWP 12—a general permit 
designed to cover utility lines impacting less than a half-acre of regulated 
waters at each “separate and distant crossing.” The term “utility lines” 
encompasses oil pipelines. Part II also introduces the GC and FS 
pipelines. Part III discusses the recent litigation over the GC Pipeline in 
the Tenth Circuit and the FS Pipeline in the D.C. Circuit. Both Circuits 
upheld the Corps’s use of NWP 12 to approve pipelines. 
Part IV argues that despite these rulings, the current use of NWP 12 in 
approving domestic oil pipelines violates the CWA’s plain meaning. The 
CWA requires the Army Corps to ensure that a general permit will have 
minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment before issuing the 
permit, and the Army Corps failed to comply with this plain meaning 
when it reissued NWP 12. If the agency cannot comply with the CWA’s 
plain meaning, then it cannot use NWP 12 to avoid individual review of 
oil pipelines. However, under the framework first described in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,23 courts are 
improperly deferring to the Army Corps’s interpretation of the CWA 
when the statute’s meaning is clear. 24 As a result, the Army Corps is able 
to evade hard-look review of domestic oil pipelines. In Part V, this Note 
concludes that although the Corps conducted more detailed NEPA 
analysis when reissuing NWP 12 in 2017, the general permit is still out of 
compliance with the CWA and is thus subject to meritorious legal 
challenges. 
I. THE CWA AND NEPA COMBINE TO SUBJECT DOMESTIC 
OIL PIPELINES CROSSING REGULATED WATERS TO 
WHOLE-PIPELINE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
While no statute requires an oil company to obtain a federal permit 
before constructing a domestic oil pipeline, if that pipeline crosses “waters 
of the United States,” the CWA requires the company to obtain a permit.25 
The need for a CWA permit triggers independent environmental review 
requirements under NEPA, which requires the federal government to 
analyze the probable environmental impact of major federal actions.26 
                                                     
23. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
24. Id. at 843–44. 
25. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38–40. 
26. Id. at 36 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004)). Additionally, 
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Understanding how the two statutory schemes work in tandem requires a 
basic understanding of both. 
A. The Clean Water Act 
The CWA’s objective “is to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”27 The Act sets 
out to accomplish this objective “by prohibiting the discharge of any 
pollutant, including dredged or fill material,” into regulated waters.28 This 
prohibition is not without exception. For example, the Army Corps may 
issue section 404 permits, which allow discharge of dredged or fill 
material into regulated waters.29 The Corps may issue an individual permit 
for a single proposed project, or it may issue a general permit with the 
potential to cover multiple not-yet-proposed projects.30 General permits 
are issued for up to five years on a state, regional, or nationwide basis,31 
and they may be reissued upon expiration.32 
The CWA allows the Corps to issue general permits—and avoid 
individual permitting—under limited circumstances. The Corps may issue 
a general permit only if the permitted activities (1) “are similar in nature,” 
(2) “will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when 
performed separately,” and (3) “will have only minimal cumulative 
adverse effect on the environment.”33 These three requirements are 
substantive limitations: the Corps may not issue a general permit if any of 
                                                     
the Bureau of Indian Affairs regulates “the granting of easements over Indian land,” and “all federal 
agencies must consult with the [Fish and Wildlife Service] to ensure that ‘any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency’ is unlikely” to adversely affect endangered or threatened 
species or their habitat. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Army Corps I), 990 F. Supp. 
2d 9, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2013). These federal schemes are not discussed in this Note. 
27. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
28. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). These permits are often referred to as section 404 permits because what 
is now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) was originally enacted in section 404 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than 
Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the 
Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 548 (2005). Meanwhile, the EPA issues permits for the 
“discharge of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see also Murchison, supra, at 538 n.83. The difference 
between a “pollutant” and “dredged or fill material” is not always clear. See generally Kory R. 
Watson, Fill Material Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A Need for Legislative Change, 35 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 335 (2011). 
30. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). 
32. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). 
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the three are not met.34 Put another way, the Corps may not issue a general 
permit if the permit would authorize dissimilar projects or result in more 
than minimal adverse environmental effects on either an individual or 
cumulative basis.35 
The Corps did not always have the option to issue a general permit. 
Originally, the CWA only permitted the Corps to issue individual, or 
section 404(a), permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material.36 The 
Corps viewed the lack of general permitting as an inconvenience37 
because individual permitting requires extensive, case-by-case review for 
each qualifying project.38 Moreover, in 1975, a district court held that the 
Corps’s CWA jurisdiction was quite broad.39 In Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,40 the court ordered the Corps to 
“[p]ublish . . . regulations clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate 
of the [CWA],” which, the court found, extended to all the nation’s waters 
“to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause.”41 
Because the Army Corps issues discharge permits,42 the broader its 
jurisdiction, the more permit applications it must consider. Thus, the 
Corps opposed this broad interpretation of its jurisdiction, expressing 
concern that the decision would require it to issue individual permits to 
“the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants 
to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants 
to protect his land against stream erosion.”43  
Although Congress would affirm the Corps’s jurisdiction over “all 
                                                     
34. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254 (D. Wyo. 
2005) (“Unlike NEPA, which imposes only procedural requirements, the CWA imposes ‘substantive 
restrictions on agency action.’” (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1273–
74 (10th Cir. 2004))). 
35. Id. 
36. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453–55 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
37. Michael Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water 
Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 695, 705 n.56 (1989) (quoting Dep’t of Army, Office of Chief of Engineers, Press Release (May 
6, 1975)). 
38. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 2013). “Individual permitting under Section 
404(a) . . . involves site-specific documentation and analysis, public interest review, and formal 
determination.” Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
39. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
40. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
41. Id. at 686. 
42. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).  
43. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 37, at 705 n.56 (quoting Dep’t of Army, Office of Chief of 
Engineers, Press Release (May 6, 1975)). 
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waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act of 1977, it did seek 
to alleviate some of the Corps’s concerns through the addition of section 
404(e), which permits the Corps to issue general permits.44 General 
permits are a less burdensome alternative to individual permitting;45 once 
issued, activities falling within the scope of a general permit ordinarily 
may proceed with “little, if any, delay or paperwork.”46 However, per 
Army Corps regulations, the terms and conditions of some general permits 
require permittees to file pre-construction notice with the Corps.47 For 
example, NWP 12, discussed in detail infra, requires a permittee to file 
pre-construction notice and seek Corps verification in seven situations, 
such as when “the utility line in waters of the United States . . . exceeds 
500 feet.”48 In such cases, the agency must verify, among other things, 
that the proposed project will cause only minimal environmental 
impacts.49 The Corps may supplement a general permit with project-
specific conditions “[t]o ensure that the activity complies with the terms 
and conditions of the NWP and that the adverse impacts on the aquatic 
environment and other aspects of the public interest are individually and 
cumulatively minimal.”50 In other words, while the CWA gives the Corps 
the ability to supplement its analysis with project-specific conditions, it 
does not require the Corps to do so. If the agency determines that a project 
cannot meet a general permit’s requirements, it will demand that the 
project proponent obtain an individual, rather than a general, permit.51 
It may help to view the general permitting process as two stages. First, 
at the issuance stage, the Army Corps issues a general permit for similar 
projects that will result in minimal impacts on both an individual and 
cumulative basis. Second, if a general permit requires pre-construction 
notice, the Corps verifies that a now-specified project falls within the 
general permit’s scope and may add conditions to ensure minimal 
impacts. This Note refers to the second stage as the verification stage. 
Once the Corps verifies that a project satisfies the previously issued 
                                                     
44. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 454–55. 
45. See id. at 467. 
46. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)–(c) (2016); Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2013). “After 
determining that a discrete category of activities will have minimal adverse effects on the 
environment, the Corps need not individually review projects that fit into that category.” Ohio Valley 
I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
47. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(d); see also Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20.  
48. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,272 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
49. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
50. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e)(2); see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39. 
51. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39. 
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NWP’s requirements, a party may complete its project. 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act 
“NEPA requires the federal government to identify and assess in 
advance the likely environmental impact of its proposed actions, including 
its authorization or permitting of private actions.”52 At the statute’s heart 
is the requirement for publicly available environmental review of 
“proposed ‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.’”53 The Army Corps must engage in NEPA analysis 
prior to granting an individual CWA permit and before issuing or 
reissuing a general CWA permit, both of which are major federal 
actions.54 
NEPA prohibits uninformed federal agency action55 by “ensuring that 
(1) agency decisions include informed and careful consideration of 
environmental impact, and (2) agencies inform the public of that impact 
and enable interested persons to participate in deciding what projects 
agencies should approve and under what terms.”56 To accomplish these 
twin aims, a federal agency must conduct an environmental analysis and 
must make that analysis available for public comment.57 Public comment 
ensures “that the larger audience . . . can provide input as necessary to the 
agency making the relevant decisions.”58 Ultimately, public comment 
assists the federal government in making informed decisions.59 
The Council on Environmental Quality—an executive body that 
interprets NEPA and establishes NEPA regulations60—details the 
required scope of an agency’s analysis.61 Among other requirements, 
agencies must analyze “cumulative actions,” or actions that, when viewed 
with other proposed actions, “have cumulatively significant impacts and 
                                                     
52. Id. at 36 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004)). 
53. Id. at 37 (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012)). If 
an agency has discretion in approving a project, it must conduct environmental analysis under NEPA. 
Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The 
touchstone of whether NEPA applies is discretion.”). 
54. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2013). Whether the Army Corps must 
engage in NEPA review at the verification stage is an issue discussed infra. 
55. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). 
56. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 36–37 (citing Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 768). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 18.  
58. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 768–69 (internal quotations omitted). 
59. See id. 
60. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1063 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring). 
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (2016). 
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should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement.”62 
Cumulative impacts, or cumulative effects,63 result “from the incremental 
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-
Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.”64 
Unlike the CWA’s substantive limitations for general permitting,65 
courts have interpreted NEPA to be solely procedural.66 NEPA merely 
requires “federal agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at their proposed actions’ 
environmental consequences in advance of deciding whether and how to 
proceed.”67 The statute does not mandate that an agency make its decision 
based on its environmental analysis; it “merely prohibits uninformed—
rather than unwise—agency action.”68 An agency can only make an 
informed decision after careful consideration of the potential 
environmental impact and the public’s comments.69 
C. The CWA and NEPA: Intertwined Statutes with Separate 
Requirements 
The relationship between the CWA and NEPA, along with the 
similarity in the language of the two statutes, can lead to confusion.70 The 
Army Corps must comply with NEPA before issuing an individual or 
general permit under section 404 of the CWA.71 The CWA requires the 
Corps to ensure that a nationwide permit will result in, among other 
                                                     
62. Id. 
63. Effects and impacts as used in the CEQ regulations are synonymous. Id. § 1508.8. Thus, 
cumulative effects and cumulative impacts are the same thing and may result from cumulative actions. 
See Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 838 F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1993) 
(explaining that cumulative actions are actions that have cumulative impacts, or cumulative effects, 
and should therefore be considered together). 
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. The CWA “imposes ‘substantive restrictions on 
agency action.’” Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254 
(D. Wyo. 2005) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1273–74 (10th Cir. 
2004)). “[T]he CWA is clear that when the effect of a general permit will be more than minimal, 
either individually or cumulatively, the Corps cannot issue the permit.” Id. 
66. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2013).  
67. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989)). 
68. Id. (quoting Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 351). 
69. See id. at 36–37 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004)). 
70. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1062–63 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Army Corps conflated its NEPA obligations with its CWA obligations). 
71. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27. 
11 - Arkfeld.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:48 AM 
2000 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1991 
 
things, “only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”72 
Meanwhile, NEPA regulations require the Corps “to consider all of the 
reasonably foreseeable . . . cumulative effects of [its] action.”73 
Accordingly, both statutes require some form of a cumulative-effects 
analysis. 
One major difference between the two analyses is that while the NEPA 
analysis is merely procedural,74 the CWA analysis is substantive.75 The 
Corps will satisfy NEPA so long as it properly analyzes all reasonably 
foreseeable cumulative effects of its permitting action—NEPA does not 
require the Corps to choose the least impactful option.76 However, the 
Corps’s burden is greater under the CWA; it may not issue a general 
permit unless future projects within the permit’s scope will result in 
minimal cumulative adverse effects.77 
The CWA and NEPA also differ on the scope of the required review. 
While CWA analysis is limited to the aquatic environment,78 NEPA 
analysis is broader, encompassing the aquatic and non-aquatic 
environments.79 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick,80 Judge McHugh—
addressing a challenge to the GC Pipeline—described what she saw as the 
Army Corps conflating its obligations under NEPA with its obligations 
under the CWA.81 Specifically, she expressed concern over the Corps 
limiting its NEPA analysis to a project’s impact on regulated waters.82 She 
explained that the regulations guiding the Corps’s general-permitting 
process specify that its CWA analysis is limited to an activity’s effect on 
the aquatic environment and therefore “may be properly limited to the 
aquatic impacts associated with the discharge of dredge and fill 
material.”83 However, Judge McHugh further explained that the scope of 
its NEPA analysis is broader than its CWA analysis, extending beyond 
                                                     
72. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
73. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.25 
(2016). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
78. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring).  
79. See id. 
80. 787 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2015). 
81. Id. at 1062–63 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). 
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the aquatic environment.84 
Other courts have “universally adopted” Judge McHugh’s 
understanding of the Corps’s NEPA obligations.85 For example, in 
Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,86 the court 
held that the Corps may not limit its NEPA analysis to regulated waters.87 
In Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,88 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Corps’s decision to issue a 
CWA permit for the construction of a project because the Corps did not 
limit its NEPA analysis to the aquatic environment.89 The court observed 
that the Corps’s NEPA analysis “considered both [the] direct and 
reasonably foreseeable indirect impacts to land use, air quality, noise, 
traffic, water quality, threatened and endangered species, and cultural 
resources.”90 In Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers,91 the Ninth Circuit 
upheld a preliminary injunction halting development of a gated 
community because the Corps only analyzed the project’s impact on 
regulated waters.92 The court highlighted the distinction between the 
Corps’s CWA analysis and its NEPA analysis: 
Although the Corps’[s] permitting authority is limited to those 
aspects of a development that directly affect jurisdictional waters, 
it has responsibility under NEPA to analyze all of the 
environmental consequences of a project. Put another way, while 
it is the development’s impact on jurisdictional waters that 
determines the scope of the Corps’[s] permitting authority, it is 
the impact of the permit on the environment at large that 
determines the Corps’[s] NEPA responsibility. The Corps’[s] 
responsibility under NEPA to consider the environmental 
consequences of a permit extends even to environmental effects 
with no impact on jurisdictional waters at all.93 
Thus, before issuing or reissuing a general permit, the Corps must 
                                                     
84. Id.  
85. Id. at 1064–65 (citing seven cases in support). 
86. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Wyo. 2005). 
87. Id. at 1240–43. 
88. 702 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2012). 
89. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063–64 (McHugh, J., concurring) (citing Hillsdale Envtl. Loss 
Prevention, Inc., 702 F.3d at 1162–64, 1172–77).  
90. Id. (quoting Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc., 702 F.3d at 1162–64, 1164 (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
91. 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
92. Id. at 1117–18. 
93. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added). 
11 - Arkfeld.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:48 AM 
2002 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1991 
 
satisfy two separate but related requirements that turn on a proper analysis 
of cumulative effects.94 Under NEPA, the Corps must complete an 
analysis of all reasonably foreseeable cumulative effects of the permit, 
and it may not limit this analysis to the aquatic environment.95 If it 
properly accounts for the foreseeable effects, the Corps will satisfy 
NEPA’s requirement of informed agency action—regardless of whether 
the cumulative effects are more than minimal.96 Under the CWA, the 
Corps must ensure that all future projects within the general permit’s 
scope will have only a minimal cumulative adverse effect on the aquatic 
environment.97 If the agency cannot show that the future projects’ 
cumulative adverse effect on regulated waters will be minimal, it may not 
issue the general permit and must individually permit the projects.98 The 
CWA, in other words, prohibits the Army Corps from issuing general, 
nationwide permits that will more than minimally impact the aquatic 
environment. 
II. NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, THE GULF COAST PIPELINE, 
AND THE FLANAGAN SOUTH PIPELINE 
The Army Corps has issued and reissued the CWA general permit 
known as NWP 12 for decades.99 The Corps may issue a general permit 
only if the permitted activities (1) “are similar in nature,” (2) “will cause 
only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately,” 
and (3) “will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the 
environment.”100 Reissued every five years,101 the 2012 version of NWP 
12 was at the heart of the recent litigation over the GC and FS pipelines, 
both of which relied extensively on NWP 12—rather than individual 
permits—to receive federal approval.102 
The Corps may use NWP 12 to approve activities falling within the 
                                                     
94. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
95. See id.  
96. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69. 
97. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
99. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1068 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
100. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
101. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 2013) (“A general permit is valid for five 
years, and can be reissued for subsequent five-year periods.”). 
102. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051–55. 
The 2012 version of NWP 12, which existed from March 19, 2012 to March 19, 2017, was used to 
approve the GC and FS pipelines. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 
(Feb. 21, 2012). 
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general permit’s scope,103 and the Corps defines NWP 12’s scope broadly. 
Specifically, the general permit authorizes “the construction, 
maintenance, repair, and removal of utility lines and associated facilities 
in waters of the United States, provided the activity does not result in the 
loss of greater than [half]-acre of waters of the United States for each 
single and complete project.”104 The definition of “utility lines” includes 
“any pipe or pipeline for the transportation of any gaseous, liquid, 
liquescent, or slurry substance, for any purpose.”105 For linear utility-line 
projects, such as oil pipelines, the Corps considers “each crossing of a 
water body at a separate and distant location” to be a “single and complete 
project.”106 Stated otherwise, depending on the number of water crossings, 
the Corps may consider one oil pipeline to consist of many separate 
projects, rather than viewing the pipeline itself as one project. In sum, to 
comply with NWP 12, the construction of an oil pipeline may not result 
in the loss of more than a half-acre of regulated water at any of the 
pipeline’s “separate and distant” regulated-water crossings.107 
Although the Army Corps conducted CWA and NEPA108 analyses 
when it reissued NWP 12 in 2012 (the issuance stage),109 the agency left 
open the possibility of additional environmental review at the verification 
stage.110 The general permit requires a permittee to file pre-construction 
notice and seek Corps verification in seven situations, including when 
“the utility line in waters of the United States . . . exceeds 500 feet” and 
                                                     
103. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20, 26; 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)–(c) (2016).  
104. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,271. 
105. Id. 
106. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (citing Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 10,290). A “linear project” is “a project constructed for the purpose of getting people, goods, or 
services from a point of origin to a terminal point, which often involves multiple crossing of one or 
more waterbodies at separate and distant locations.” Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 10,195. “Roads and pipelines are examples of linear projects.” Id. at 10,263.  
For linear projects crossing a single or multiple waterbodies several times at separate and distant 
locations, each crossing is considered a single and complete project for purposes of NWP 
authorization. However, individual channels in a braided stream or river, or individual arms of a 
large, irregularly shaped wetland or lake, etc., are not separate waterbodies, and crossings of 
such features cannot be considered separately.  
Id. at 10,290. 
107. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (citing Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 10,290). 
108. The NEPA analysis resulted in a finding of no significant impact. Reissuance of Nationwide 
Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,269. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 10,196–97 (“[P]re-construction notification thresholds are necessary . . . to allow district 
engineers the opportunity to review those activities to determine whether they will result in minimal 
adverse effects on the aquatic environment.”). 
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when “discharges . . . result in the loss of greater than 1/10-acre of 
[regulated waters].”111 
Despite being reissued for decades, oil companies historically did not 
use NWP 12 to approve major oil pipelines.112 However, the GC and FS 
pipelines changed everything. TransCanada Corporation’s 485-mile113 
GC Pipeline, which transports oil from Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast,114 
relied on the permit for each of its 2,227 separate and distant water 
crossings.115 The FS Pipeline, which carries oil 593 miles from Illinois to 
Oklahoma,116 relied on the same permit 1,950 times.117 The GC and FS 
pipelines thus provided a novel situation. Rather than individually 
permitting each pipeline—which, since the pipelines cross regulated 
waters, would have required environmental review of the entire projects—
the Army Corps used NWP 12 to approve each of the pipelines’ separate 
and distant crossings. Put bluntly, this use of NWP 12 allowed the Corps 
to evade whole-pipeline review. 
III. THE TENTH AND D.C. CIRCUITS REJECT CHALLENGES TO 
THE ARMY CORPS’S USE OF NWP 12 TO APPROVE OIL 
PIPELINES. 
In January 2014,118 the GC Pipeline began transporting oil from 
Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast.119 Prior to this, three groups, including the 
                                                     
111. 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,272 (requiring pre-construction notice in the following situations: “(1) [t]he 
activity involves mechanized land clearing in a forested wetland for the utility line right-of-way; (2) 
a section 10 permit is required; (3) the utility line in waters of the United States, excluding overhead 
lines, exceeds 500 feet; (4) the utility line is placed within a jurisdictional area (i.e., water of the 
United States), and it runs parallel to or along a stream bed that is within that jurisdictional area; (5) 
discharges that result in the loss of greater than 1⁄10-acre of waters of the United States; (6) permanent 
access roads are constructed above grade in waters of the United States for a distance of more than 
500 feet; or (7) permanent access roads are constructed in waters of the United States with impervious 
materials”). 
112. See Sierra Club et al., Comment Letter on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposal to 
Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permit 12, No. COE-2015-0017, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Global-Warming/Tar-Sands/NWP-12-Comments_FINAL_ 
080116.ashx [http://perma.cc/L6LG-LL84] [hereinafter NWP 12: Public Comments]. 
113. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1046 (10th Cir. 2015). 
114. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2013). 
115. Id. at 901 (Martínez, J., dissenting). 
116. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
117. Id. at 38. 
118. Bill Chappell, Keystone Pipeline’s Southern Section Begins Delivering Oil to Gulf Coast, NPR 
(Jan. 22, 2014, 9:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/I-way/2014/01/22/265076621/keystone-
pipeline-s-southern-section-begins-delivering-oil-to-gulf-coast [http://perma.cc/MB5Y-KMEQ]. 
119. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x at 887. 
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Sierra Club, sued the federal government, challenging the Army Corps’s 
NEPA analysis of NWP 12 at both the issuance and verification stage.120 
The environmental groups also challenged the Army Corps’s use of NWP 
12 to approve the pipeline, arguing that the Corps failed to ensure minimal 
cumulative adverse effects.121 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, the Tenth 
Circuit ruled in favor of the federal government.122 
The FS Pipeline carries oil 593 miles from Illinois to Oklahoma.123 The 
Sierra Club sued the federal government as soon as Enbridge Pipelines 
began constructing the oil pipeline in 2013.124 The Sierra Club made 
several arguments, attacking the government’s failure “to analyze and 
invite public comment on the environmental impact of the whole pipeline 
under NEPA” and criticizing the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 in the 
approval process.125 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,126 the D.C. Circuit rejected the Sierra Club’s arguments, 
approving the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 and holding “that the federal 
government was not required to conduct NEPA analysis of the entirety of 
the Flanagan South [P]ipeline.”127 
Environmental groups focused their litigation on the CWA and NEPA. 
The two statutes require the Army Corps to complete separate but related 
analyses before reissuing NWP 12.128 However, the Corps argued that it 
was too difficult to complete its analysis before, for example, oil 
companies proposed a specific oil pipeline.129 The agency contended that 
the difficulty arose because of the scope of nationwide permits, which 
entities may use to “authorize activities across the nation . . . in a wide 
variety of environmental settings.”130 The Army Corps further argued that 
this difficulty allowed it to push some of its analysis to the verification 
stage—as opposed to the issuance stage when most environmental 
                                                     
120. See id. at 887–88. 
121. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (10th Cir. 2015). 
122. Id. at 1047. 
123. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
124. Id. at 34. 
125. Id. 
126. 803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
127. Id. at 34. 
128. See supra section I.C. 
129. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir. 2015) (outlining the Army Corps’s 
argument). 
130. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 528, Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043 (No. 14-
6099)). 
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analysis traditionally occurs.131 In fact, for both the GC and FS pipelines, 
the Corps only considered the cumulative impact of each pipeline’s stream 
crossings in a single review at the verification stage,132 if at all.133 By that 
point, the public had no remaining opportunity to comment.134 
A major issue, then, is whether the law permits the Army Corps to defer 
any of its NEPA or CWA analysis, and if it does, which parts it may 
legally defer. The Tenth Circuit held that the Corps may partially defer its 
CWA analysis to the verification stage.135 The Tenth and D.C. Circuits 
held that no NEPA analysis is required at the verification stage.136 Judge 
McHugh’s concurrence in the Tenth Circuit went a step further, arguing 
that the Army Corps may not conduct additional NEPA review at the 
verification stage; instead, the Corps must complete all NEPA review at 
the issuance stage.137 
A second issue is whether the Army Corps’s CWA and NEPA analyses 
sufficiently scrutinized NWP 12’s cumulative effects, regardless of 
whether the analyses occurred at the issuance or verification stage.138 The 
Tenth and D.C. Circuits in the GC and FS pipeline litigation upheld the 
CWA analysis.139 However, both Circuits strongly questioned the 
sufficiency of the NEPA analysis but did not rule either way because the 
issue was not properly before them.140 
                                                     
131. See id. at 1058–60. 
132. See id. at 1061 (noting that “the record shows that district engineers analyzed the cumulative 
impacts of the proposed crossings” at the verification stage). 
133. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that NWP 12 permits the 
Corps to evaluate cumulative effects on a regional basis, suggesting that all the crossings were never 
analyzed together). 
134. Cf. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1060 (arguing that “partial deferral would not restrict the public’s 
ability to comment on proposed permits” because the public has an opportunity to comment at the 
issuance stage); see also infra section IV.B. 
135. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051, 1056. 
136. Id. at 1052–54; Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2013). 
137. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
138. See, e.g., id. at 1060–61 (majority opinion) (rejecting arguments that the Army Corps’s 
analysis was deficient). 
139. Id.; see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
140. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 40 n.3 (“To the extent that the Corps . . . understood its NEPA 
obligations as confined to considering environmental effects on CWA jurisdictional waters, its view 
misapprehends the obligations of any agency taking action subject to NEPA to do a comprehensive 
analysis of all types of foreseeable environmental effects.”); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8 (“In her 
thoughtful concurrence, Judge McHugh concludes that it would have been obvious to the Corps that 
its analysis of cumulative effects was too restrictive. In our view, however, the environmental groups 
did not invoke the obviousness exception on the NEPA claims involving cumulative effects.”).  
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A. Courts Allow the Army Corps to Partially Defer Its CWA Analysis 
to the Verification Stage, but They Do Not Require Additional 
NEPA Review at that Stage 
Courts have allowed the Army Corps to defer a portion of its CWA 
analysis to the verification stage.141 In such cases, courts do not require 
the Corps to supplement its deferred analysis with additional NEPA 
review.142 This limits the public’s ability to comment on proposed 
projects.143 Relatedly, it limits the agency’s ability to fully analyze the 
cumulative environmental impacts of projects falling within NWP 12’s 
scope.144 
1. Courts Allow the Corps to Partially Defer Its CWA Analysis 
The CWA allows the Corps to issue a general permit only if the 
permitted activities “will cause only minimal adverse environmental 
effects when performed separately,” and “will have only minimal 
cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”145 Per Army Corps 
regulations, some general permits require the Army Corps to verify that 
an individual project falls within the permit’s scope.146 Environmental 
groups have sued the Army Corps for conducting CWA review while 
verifying a project, as they believe the CWA requires the agency to 
complete all review at the issuance stage.147 
In the GC Pipeline litigation, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Army Corps violated the CWA because it improperly 
deferred a portion of its required environmental analysis to the verification 
stage.148 In so holding, the court employed the two-step Chevron test.149 
Under the test, first laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., a court first looks to see if Congress directly spoke 
                                                     
141. See infra section III.A.1. 
142. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1052–54; Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
143. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 468 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (“NWP 21 eliminates public 
involvement in decision-making at a stage where meaningful input in the minimal impact 
determination is possible.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
144. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
145. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
147. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051, 1056 (rejecting arguments that the Army Corps may 
not partially defer its analysis). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
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on the issue.150 To do so, courts “employ[] traditional tools of statutory 
construction.”151 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”152 
If the intent of Congress is not clear, the court determines whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the law is acceptable, and if it is, the court will 
defer to the agency.153 Because the Tenth Circuit in Bostick found that 
Congress had not directly answered whether the Corps may defer the 
cumulative effects analysis under the CWA, it proceeded to step two of 
the Chevron test.154 The court ultimately concluded that the Army Corps 
permissibly interpreted the CWA as allowing the agency to defer its 
analysis.155 A decade earlier, a federal district court in West Virginia had 
held that the Army Corps’s interpretation was unacceptable, only to be 
overruled by the Fourth Circuit the following year.156 Understanding this 
prior litigation is key to understanding the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the 
GC Pipeline litigation, as well as the broader debate. 
a. Nationwide Permit 21 and the Origins of CWA Deferral 
The West Virginia case, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. 
Bulen,157 involved Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21), a permit comparable 
to NWP 12.158 Like NWP 12, the version of NWP 21 at issue in Ohio 
Valley required pre-construction notice159 and Army Corps verification.160 
                                                     
150. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1056 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). 
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
152. Id. at 842–43. 
153. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1056–57 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). 
154. Id. at 1057. 
155. Id. at 1057–60. 
156. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley II), 429 F.3d 493, 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
157. 410 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
158. NWP 21 authorizes discharges “associated with surface coal mining and reclamation 
operations . . . .” Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (citing Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 
67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2081 (Jan. 15, 2002)).  
159. Compare Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,272 (Feb. 21, 2012) 
(NWP 12 requires pre-construction notification in seven situations), with Issuance of Nationwide 
Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2090 (NWP 21 requires pre-construction notification). 
160. Compare Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (in situations requiring pre-
construction notice, the Corps must verify that the activity satisfies NWP 12’s conditions), with Ohio 
Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (“The Corps must approve all NWP 21 projects before they can 
proceed to construction.”). 
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Unlike the Tenth Circuit in the GC Pipeline litigation,161 the district court 
in Ohio Valley found, under step one of Chevron, that “the [CWA] 
unambiguously requires determination of minimal impact before, not 
after, the issuance of a nation wide permit.”162 The court held that “[i]f the 
Corps cannot define a category of activities that will have minimal effects, 
absent individual review of each activity, the activities are inappropriate 
for general permitting.”163 Thus, according to the district court, deferral is 
improper: 
The issuance of a nationwide permit . . . functions as a guarantee 
ab initio that every instance of the permitted activity will meet the 
minimal impact standard. Congress intended for a potential 
discharger whose project fits into one of those categories to begin 
discharging with no further involvement from the Corps, no 
uncertainty, and no red tape.164 
The court supported its reading of the statute with legislative history,165 
including the following exchange between Senator Nunn and Senator 
Muskie, the co-sponsor of the 1972 Clean Water Act and floor manager 
of the Clean Water Act of 1977.166 Given Senator Muskie’s role, the 
Fourth Circuit has given his comments “significant weight . . . in 
construing the Clean Water Act.”167 
Senator Nunn: I believe that general permits for dredge and fill 
activities can help eliminate lengthy delay and administrative red-
tape. However, it is important that such general permits be drafted 
in a reasonable manner so as not to negate their usefulness. For 
example, the [C]orps’[s] proposed general permit for mining in 
Georgia contains a requirement that even though an activity is 
generally permitted, a person wishing to conduct such permitted 
activity must still give the [C]orps notice 45 days in advance of 
conducting the activity. The [C]orps then would have an 
unlimited time to approve or disapprove the activity. Thus, the 
[C]orps in essence is requiring activities to be individually 
permitted even though it purports to generally permit the 
activities . . . . 
                                                     
161. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1060 (10th Cir. 2015). 
162. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
163. Id. at 467. 
164. Id. at 465–66 (emphasis omitted). 
165. The Supreme Court itself looked to legislative history in its original Chevron analysis. 467 
U.S. 837, 862–64 (1984). 
166. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 468–69.   
167. Id. at 469 (quoting Champion Int’l Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
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For general permits to be meaningful, it seems to me that once a 
general permit is obtained, it should authorize activities generally 
without separate approval being required before undertaking each 
such permitted activity. Am I correct that the general permits 
contemplated here are intended to grant permission to conduct 
activities without such separate approval from the [C]orps or a 
State each time that activity is to be conducted, or without any 
more than reasonable notice? 
Senator Muskie: Yes; the Senator is correct.168 
Additionally, the Ohio Valley district court looked to comments made 
by Representative Ray Roberts, the chairman of the House committee 
responsible for the passage of the Clean Water Act of 1977.169 
Representative Roberts, on the day the Clean Water Act of 1977 passed 
the House,170 stated: 
While requiring some degree of notification of the proposed 
activity to the [C]orps may be reasonable, it would be 
unreasonable to require that the activity not be commenced until 
the [C]orps grants its consent. This would defeat the purpose of 
general permits which is to avoid individual applications and 
review.171  
The court found Senator Muskie’s and Representative Robert’s comments 
indicative of Congress’s express intent: “nationwide permits under 
Section 404(e) require a final determination of minimal environmental 
impact before, not after, issuance.”172 Ultimately, the court held that a 
deferred, case-by-case analysis “defeats this clear purpose.”173 
Before the Fourth Circuit ruled on appeal,174 another district court cited 
the Ohio Valley district court decision approvingly,175 and many believed 
the Fourth Circuit would affirm the district court’s ruling.176 But the 
                                                     
168. 4 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT OF 1977, at 1053–54 (1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA]. 
169. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
170. Id. 
171. 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA, supra note 168, at 349. 
172. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (emphasis in original). 
173. Id. 
174. Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
175. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345–47 (M.D. Fla. 
2005), vacated by 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
176. Joseph Dawley, Unintended Consequences: Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, Mountaintop 
Mining and Related Litigation, TRENDS: ABA SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES NEWSL., Jan.–
Feb. 2005, at 13 (“The practical effect of this ruling, which many believe will be affirmed on appeal, 
will be the requirement for individual permits that will trigger environmental review under the 
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Fourth Circuit overruled the district court in part, avoiding any discussion 
of legislative history.177 Under Chevron step one, the court held that the 
CWA “is silent on the question whether the Corps may make its pre-
issuance minimal impact determinations by relying in part on the fact that 
its post-issuance procedures will ensure that the authorized projects will 
have only minimal impacts.”178 Under step two of Chevron, the Fourth 
Circuit found the Army Corps’s partial deferral entirely reasonable, noting 
the difficulty of predicting the impact of activities not yet identified.179 
Three judges dissented from the Fourth Circuit’s decision to deny 
rehearing en banc, arguing that the Corps’s pre-issuance CWA analysis 
came up short.180 
b. The Tenth Circuit Relied on the Fourth Circuit’s Ohio Valley 
Decision in Holding that the Army Corps May Partially Defer Its 
CWA Analysis 
A decade after the Ohio Valley cases, both the Tenth Circuit in the GC 
Pipeline litigation and the D.C. Circuit in the FS Pipeline litigation cited 
the Fourth Circuit’s ruling approvingly.181 However, only the Tenth 
Circuit discussed CWA deferral in depth.182 In the GC Pipeline litigation, 
the Tenth Circuit explained that partially deferring the CWA analysis is 
reasonable, given the difficulty of anticipating impacts from all future 
projects that may fall within the scope of a general permit.183 This 
difficulty is at its zenith for nationwide permits, the scope of which 
includes many projects taking place across the country.184 For example, 
NWP 12 applies to utility lines, which may be used for a multitude of 
purposes, such as “carrying resources (like water, fuel, and electricity), 
facilitating communication (like telephone lines, internet connections, and 
                                                     
National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act.”). 
177. See generally Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493. 
178. Id. at 501; see also id. at 500 (“Neither the phrase ‘guarantee ab initio’ nor the phrase ‘initial 
certainty’ appears in section 404(e).” (emphasis omitted)). 
179. Id. at 501–02. 
180. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 437 F.3d 421, 422–24 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (King, J., 
dissenting). 
181. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir. 
2015) (“Though we are not bound by [Ohio Valley II], we regard it as persuasive.”). 
182. Plaintiffs did not pursue a facial challenge to NWP 12 in the FS Pipeline litigation. Army 
Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Significantly, Plaintiffs have eschewed any facial 
challenge to NWP 12 itself.”). 
183. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1058. 
184. Id. 
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cable television), and removing waste.”185 Because of the inherent 
difficulty of analyzing the cumulative effects of such a wide variety of 
potential projects, the court held that it was reasonable for the Army Corps 
to analyze only foreseeable effects at the issuance stage and to defer 
unforeseeable aspects to the verification stage. By the verification stage a 
proposing party will have specified its project, allowing the Corps to 
conduct a more precise analysis.186 
2. Neither the Tenth nor the D.C. Circuits Require the Army Corps to 
Conduct Additional NEPA Review at the Verification Stage 
According to the Tenth and D.C. Circuits, the Army Corps is not 
required to conduct additional NEPA review at the verification stage.187 
In fact, requiring additional NEPA review at this later stage is 
incompatible with the streamlining nature of general permits.188 Instead, 
courts have held that once the Corps issues a nationwide permit in 
compliance with NEPA, it has completed the requisite NEPA review; at 
the verification stage, the agency simply ensures compliance with the 
previously issued, extensively reviewed nationwide permit.189 
At least one judge has argued that the Army Corps should conduct 
additional NEPA review at the verification stage. During the GC Pipeline 
litigation, Judge Martínez argued in a dissenting opinion that, given “the 
number of permits issued by the Corps relative to the overall size of the 
Gulf Coast Pipeline,” it is “patently ludicrous” to allege that the Corps’s 
involvement at the verification stage does not require NEPA review.190 
Not only did Judge Martínez’s argument fail to persuade his fellow 
judges, his argument also failed to persuade the judges in the FS Pipeline 
litigation. There, the court found that the number of verifications per 
pipeline makes no difference: 
By Plaintiffs’ logic, one construction project that requires 2,000 
verifications for water crossings would be subject to further 
environmental review under NEPA, while 2,000 separate projects 
                                                     
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1058–63. 
187. See id. at 1052–54; Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 49–52 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
188. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2013). 
189. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1054 (10th Cir. 2015); Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 27–27. 
190. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x 885, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2013) (Martínez, J., dissenting from majority’s 
denial of plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction). “The Gulf Coast Pipeline is 485 miles long, 
and required the Corps to issue 2,227 permits for water crossings. This means that the Gulf Coast 
Pipeline crosses United States waters almost five times in each mile, or about once every 1,150 feet.” 
Id. at 899. 
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that each require a single verification for a water crossing would 
not necessarily require additional review, despite the fact that 
both scenarios theoretically pose the same potential threat to the 
aquatic environment.191 
The concept that the Army Corps does not have to conduct additional 
NEPA review at the verification stage appears to have won out. Although 
not expressly stated in the Tenth and D.C. Circuit opinions,192 the 
conclusion that the Army Corps need not conduct additional NEPA 
review during the verification stage implies that the Corps must complete 
all NEPA review during the issuance stage.193 Additionally, Judge 
McHugh outlined in her concurrence two reasons why the Corps must 
complete all NEPA review at the earlier stage. 
First, agencies must “complete their environmental analysis at the point 
of agency action.”194 NEPA requires an agency to take a “hard look” at an 
action’s potential environmental impact before taking the action,195 and 
this is impossible if the agency intentionally defers all or a portion of its 
analysis.196 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Ballard,197 plaintiffs sued the 
Corps, alleging that the agency failed to conduct a cumulative-effects 
analysis under NEPA for three nationwide permits.198 The Corps’s stance 
was similar to the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning for allowing a partial deferral 
of the CWA analysis;199 it argued that it is difficult to predict a nationwide 
permit’s potential impact because the impact depends on how often a 
nationwide permit is used in a specified geographic area.200 Therefore, the 
Corps continued, it is more sensible to conduct a cumulative-effects 
analysis under NEPA at a regional level.201 However, the court found that 
the analysis was never completed; instead, any additional analysis was 
limited to a case-by-case assessment that failed to analyze the cumulative 
effects of the nationwide permit, under which thousands of projects could 
                                                     
191. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 28 n.14. 
192. See generally Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 42; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047. 
193. Cf. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring) (explaining why the Army Corps 
may not defer its NEPA analysis). 
194. See id. 
195. Id. (citing Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 
2008)). 
196. Id. 
197. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Ariz. 1999). 
198. Id. at 1101. 
199. See supra section III.A.1.b. 
200. Defs. of Wildlife, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1106, 1115 (internal quotations omitted). 
201. Id. 
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fall.202 Although the Army Corps must assess the cumulative effects of all 
projects falling within a general permit’s scope, the court observed that it 
was merely analyzing the cumulative effects of individual projects in 
isolation.203 While deferral may be helpful to analyze the cumulative 
effects of individual projects, it is not helpful to analyze the cumulative 
effects of the nationwide permit itself.204 Because the Army Corps must 
analyze the latter, the court held deferral improper.205 
Similarly, in Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Corps argued that it deferred its NEPA analysis of a general 
permit because “it is impossible to know ‘precisely what specific impacts 
might result until a particular project is proposed.’”206 Although the court 
acknowledged the inherent difficulty of predicting the cumulative effects 
of projects not yet proposed, it held that the difficulty does not excuse the 
Corps from analyzing foreseeable problems before issuing a nationwide 
permit.207 Like the Defenders of Wildlife court, it rejected the Corps’s 
attempt to defer its analysis: “[b]y their very nature, the cumulative 
impacts of a general permit cannot be evaluated in the context of approval 
of a single project.”208 Once again, a court noted that deferral is not helpful 
to analyze the cumulative effects of the nationwide permit itself and found 
the Corps’s NEPA analysis deficient.209 
Second, Judge McHugh argued that the Corps may not defer its NEPA 
analysis because of the strong possibility that the analysis will remain 
deferred for good.210 She noted that in many situations where the Corps 
defers the NEPA analysis, neither it nor any other agency ever completes 
the analysis.211 Largely due to the lack of required federal oversight of oil 
pipeline construction—the Army Corps’s jurisdiction is over regulated 
waters broadly, not oil pipelines specifically212—domestic oil pipelines 
                                                     
202. Id. at 1112–13. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. at 1113 (“While Defendants’ scope of analysis may be appropriate for a site-specific 
NWP authorization, it is inadequate to measure the impact of implementing the NWP program under 
which thousands of projects will be authorized.”). 
205. See id. 
206. Id. at 1242 (quoting Respondent’s Merits Brief at 39, Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254 (D. Wyo. 2005) (No. 02-CV-0155-D)). 
207. Id. at 1243. 
208. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
209. See id. 
210. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1067 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring). 
211. See id. (“[I]n the context of nationwide permits, it may well be that, as happened here, there 
is no lead agency that will conduct an environmental assessment.”). 
212. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Because Congress has not authorized 
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such as the GC and FS pipelines generally do not have a lead agency.213 
This results in no clear choice of agency to conduct further NEPA 
analysis.214 Additionally, nationwide permits often allow activities to 
commence without Corps verification.215 If pre-construction notice is not 
required, no additional NEPA analysis will ever be considered, and the 
deferred analysis will remain deferred for good.216 Thus, the Corps must 
“fully evaluate all of the required NEPA factors before reissuing NWP 
12.”217 
Although Judge McHugh raised concerns over the defects of the Army 
Corps’s deferral practice, she ultimately wrote in concurrence rather than 
dissent.218 She did so because no commenter objected to the Corps’s 
deferral practice during the NEPA notice and comment period—even 
though “[t]he Corps has been issuing and reissuing NWP 12 for 
decades.”219 Although some issues are “so obvious”220 that a commentator 
need not specifically object during notice and comment to preserve the 
issue for trial,221 Judge McHugh did not believe the Corps’s deferral 
practice was one of those issues.222 Although neither court expressly held 
that the Army Corps must complete its NEPA analysis at the issuance 
stage, Judge McHugh’s concurrence strongly suggests that the Corps may 
not defer.223 
                                                     
the federal government to oversee construction of a domestic oil pipeline, Plaintiffs’ complaint relies 
on a series of federal environmental laws and regulations that require federal agencies with some 
involvement in domestic pipeline construction to follow certain procedures.”). 
213. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
214. See id. 
215. Id.  
216. Id.  
217. Id. (emphasis in original). 
218. Id. at 1067–68.  
219. Id.  
220. The court will usually not hear a plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff failed to raise the issue during 
the NEPA notice-and-comment period; an exception to the rule is when the court deems the issue “so 
obvious” that raising the issue during notice and comment was unnecessary. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public 
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764–65 (2004). 
221. Id. at 765. For example, Judge McHugh believed that the Corps’s failure to consider 
environmental effects outside the aquatic environment was so obvious that no commenter needed to 
raise the argument. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1065 (McHugh, J., concurring). 
222. Id. at 1067–68.  
223. See id. at 1067. In its 2017 reissuance of NWP 12, the Army Corps stated it does not defer its 
NEPA analysis. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1,860, 1,891 (Jan. 6, 
2017). 
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B. The Courts Approved the Army Corps’s CWA Analysis While 
Strongly Questioning the Agency’s NEPA Analysis 
In addition to allowing the Corps to partially defer its CWA analysis, 
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits approved the sufficiency of the partially 
deferred analysis. The Tenth Circuit held that the Corps’s verification of 
the GC Pipeline was not arbitrary or capricious, in part because it could 
“reasonably discern that the agency analyzed the cumulative impacts of 
the proposed crossings” at the verification stage.224 For example, the court 
noted that the agency “prepared verification memoranda that describe the 
Corps’[s] analysis of pipeline impacts.”225 The D.C. Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion, holding that the Army Corps’s conclusions were 
“made at the end of a lengthy memorandum explaining, among other 
things, the details concerning the scope of the proposed project in each 
respective district, [and] the expected effect of the project on [regulated] 
waters.”226 
The courts were not as satisfied with the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis, 
but neither court ruled on the issue. Judge McHugh explained that, in her 
view, the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis was insufficient because it 
improperly limited the analysis to the aquatic environment.227 The Tenth 
and D.C. Circuits referred to Judge McHugh’s analysis as “thoughtful.”228 
However, the Tenth Circuit held the argument waived,229 and the Sierra 
Club did not raise the issue in the D.C. Circuit.230 
                                                     
224. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1060–61; see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
In the litigation over the GC and FS pipelines, the courts reviewed plaintiffs’ NEPA and CWA 
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). Army Corps 
II, 803 F.3d at 42; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047. Under the APA, courts will overturn an agency action 
if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047. Generally, a court will uphold an agency’s 
action if the agency made a reasonable choice based on the relevant factors and alternatives. Bostick 
II, 787 F.3d at 1047 (citing Mt. Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
225. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061. The court rejected the environmental groups’ argument that the 
memoranda were deficient, deferring to the trial court’s holding that the groups waived the argument 
by failing to properly raise it. Id. at 1061 n.19. 
226. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 52–53 (citing Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 64 
F. Supp. 3d 128, 157 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
227. See supra section I.C. 
228. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 40 n.3; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8. 
229. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8. 
230. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39–40. 
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IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE ARMY CORPS TO 
DEFER ANY OF ITS ANALYSIS 
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have so far upheld the use of NWP 12 as 
a tool for approving domestic oil pipelines,231 and their decisions have 
shed light on the Corps’s separate but related CWA and NEPA 
analyses.232 The Tenth Circuit followed Fourth Circuit precedent allowing 
a partially deferred CWA analysis under Chevron deference.233 Despite 
the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, partially deferring the CWA analysis violates 
the CWA’s text, structure, purpose, and legislative history, which reveals 
that the Army Corps must complete all analysis before issuing a permit. 
Moreover, deferral unacceptably allows the Corps to avoid the combined 
effect of NEPA and the CWA, limiting the public’s ability to comment. 
Therefore, Army Corps regulations allowing partial deferral fail under 
Chevron step one. Courts should reject recent precedent and reconcile 
general permitting with the CWA’s plain meaning. 
A. The CWA Is Clear: The Army Corps May Not Defer Its Analysis 
The Army Corps must approve projects falling within the scope of a 
general permit without additional review. The CWA’s objective “is to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”234 Under the CWA’s plain language, the agency may 
not issue a general permit unless it can show that the permit’s cumulative 
adverse effect on regulated waters will be minimal.235 If the Army Corps 
can show that the permit will have a minimal adverse effect, it may issue 
the permit, and all projects falling within the permit’s scope may proceed 
without further analysis.236 Because the agency must show minimal 
effects at the issuance stage,237 additional analysis at the verification stage 
is unnecessary. In other words, if the Army Corps satisfies its CWA 
                                                     
231. See id. at 33–35; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061. 
232. See supra section I.C. 
233. See supra section III.A.1.b. 
234. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
235. Id. § 1344(e)(1) (“Secretary may . . . issue general permits . . . for any category of 
activities . . . if the Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will 
cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only 
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”); see also Julia Fuschino, Note, Mountaintop 
Coal Mining and the Clean Water Act: The Fight Over Nationwide Permit 21, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 179, 203–05 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
236. See supra section I.A. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
11 - Arkfeld.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2017  9:48 AM 
2018 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1991 
 
responsibility by properly analyzing the permit’s potential effects at the 
issuance stage, it will not have any analysis left to complete at the 
verification stage. If the Army Corps cannot satisfy the CWA’s general-
permitting requirements, it is not out of options. The same section of the 
CWA providing for general permitting also provides for individual 
permitting.238 Thus, the CWA directly speaks against deferral. If the Army 
Corps cannot satisfy the CWA’s general-permitting provisions at the 
issuance stage, the answer is not deferral; rather, it must proceed with 
permitting on an individual basis. 
Additionally, the circumstances in which Congress created the general-
permitting option suggest that it intended general permitting to obviate 
potentially burdensome individual review only for small projects.239 
Before general permits, the Army Corps expressed concern over having 
to individually permit too many projects. After the Callaway court 
broadly defined the Corps’s jurisdiction,240 the agency argued the decision 
would require it to issue an individual permit to, for example, a rancher 
hoping to enlarge her stock pond, a farmer desiring to deepen his irrigation 
ditch or plow a field, or a mountaineer wanting to protect her land from 
stream erosion.241 Noticeably absent from this list is the oil tycoon hoping 
to profit from a massive, interstate pipeline that will cross thousands of 
regulated waters. The concern was that the Army Corps’s broad 
jurisdiction required individual permitting of small projects, which the 
agency viewed as an unnecessary waste of time. In creating a general-
permitting alternative, Congress sought to alleviate some of the Corps’s 
concerns.242 
Finally, the legislative history of general permitting suggests that the 
Army Corps may not defer its CWA analysis. Senator Muskie, influential 
in the legislation adding the general permitting option to the CWA, 
confirmed that once issued, general permits do not require the Army 
Corps to separately approve each project falling within the permit’s 
scope.243 Representative Roberts, also influential in the legislation adding 
the general permitting option to the CWA, added that requiring the Army 
Corps to approve each separate project “would be unreasonable” and 
                                                     
238. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (e). 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 36–45. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 36–43. 
241. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (citing Blumm & Zaleha, supra 
note 37, at 705 n.56), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
242. Id. at 454–55. 
243. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA, supra note 168, at 1053–54.  
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“would defeat the purpose of general permits.”244 The district court in 
Ohio Valley relied in part on this legislative history in holding that the 
Army Corps may not defer its CWA analysis.245 The Fourth Circuit 
reversed, but it did not mention any legislative history in its opinion.246 
Instead, the circuit court held that the CWA permits deferral, noting the 
difficulty of predicting the environmental impact of yet-to-be-identified 
projects.247 The court also noted that the CWA does not explicitly prohibit 
the Army Corps from relying on a to-be-completed analysis at the 
issuance stage.248 However, as just articulated, the CWA does explicitly 
prohibit deferral.249 Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in conducting its own Chevron analysis,250 similarly 
failing to examine the legislative history.251 
In sum, any review beyond a simple verification—a mere affirmation 
that the project falls within the general permit’s scope—violates the 
streamlining nature of the permits and blurs the line between general and 
individual permits. By allowing the Corps to defer a general permit’s 
unforeseeable effects to the verification stage,252 courts are allowing more 
than a simple verification. They are allowing the Army Corps to analyze 
and then verify. However, the CWA sets a high bar: prior to issuance, the 
Corps must prove that the permit will result in minimal adverse 
environmental effects, both individually and cumulatively.253 If it cannot 
prove minimal adverse effects, it may not issue the general permit. 
Without a general permit, the Army Corps must individually permit 
proposed projects such as oil pipelines—requiring whole-project 
environmental review. 
B. The CWA Must Remain Coupled with Its NEPA Counterpart to 
Provide the Public with an Opportunity to Comment 
NEPA provides the public with an opportunity to comment on 
                                                     
244. Id. at 349. 
245. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
246. See generally Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
247. Id. at 501. 
248. See id. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 235–23838. 
250. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir. 2015). 
251. See generally id. 
252. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1058–60. 
253. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
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proposed projects.254 When permitting an individual project, the Army 
Corps has no opportunity to defer either its CWA or NEPA analysis to a 
verification stage, as there is no verification stage. Thus, the CWA and 
NEPA necessarily work together, providing the public an opportunity to 
comment before the Army Corps may grant the permit. Public comment 
is critical; NEPA’s requirement for a public comment period reflects its 
importance. Public comment ensures “that the larger audience . . . can 
provide input as necessary to the agency making the relevant 
decisions,”255 and it assists the federal government in making informed 
decisions.256 General permits inappropriately change the calculus by 
limiting the opportunity for public comment to the issuance stage—
despite additional review taking place at the verification stage. 
Courts have allowed the Army Corps to partially defer its CWA 
analysis of general permits to the verification stage257 while not requiring 
additional NEPA review.258 The Army Corps’s issuance of a general 
permit is a major federal action, triggering NEPA.259 However, NEPA 
review is absent from the deferred portion of the Corps’s CWA analysis. 
This effectively limits public comment to the issuance stage, at which time 
entities have yet to specify any projects. In other words, the public is left 
to comment on unspecified, abstract projects. It also creates an 
inappropriate double standard. On one hand, courts allow a deferred CWA 
analysis because of the inherent difficulty of predicting future projects at 
the issuance stage.260 On the other, courts limit the public’s ability to 
comment to this same, abstract stage. This impediment to public comment 
is one reason the district court in Ohio Valley found CWA deferral 
inappropriate;261 the court observed that CWA deferral “eliminates public 
involvement in decision-making at a stage where meaningful input in the 
minimal impact determination is possible.”262 
To appropriately give effect to NEPA’s public-comment requirement, 
                                                     
254. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012); Army Corps I, 990 F. 
Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2013).  
255. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–69 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
256. See id. 
257. See supra section III.A.1. 
258. See supra section III.A.2. 
259. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 19, 21.  
260. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058–60 (10th Cir. 2015). Moreover, Judge McHugh 
persuasively argued that the Corps must complete its NEPA analysis at the issuance stage. See supra 
section III.A.2. 
261. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 468 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 
F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). 
262. Id. 
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the Army Corps must tether all CWA analysis to NEPA analysis. 
Untethering the two analyses is incompatible with NEPA’s public-
comment mandate. The Corps has two options: (1) conduct NEPA review 
at the verification stage, or (2) stop partially deferring its CWA analysis. 
The first option cannot be squared with recent judicial precedent,263 nor 
can it be squared with the CWA’s streamlining nature.264 Thus, to provide 
adequate opportunity for public comment, the Army Corps must complete 
its entire CWA and NEPA analyses at the issuance stage. If it is 
impossible to do so, the agency must turn to individual permitting. 
C. Courts Should Not Excuse Compliance with the CWA Simply 
Because Compliance Is Difficult 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning for allowing partial CWA 
deferral—the “inherent difficulty” of predicting future projects—cannot 
overcome the CWA’s plain language. Moreover, the reasoning is at odds 
with other courts’ reasoning for disallowing NEPA deferral. For example, 
in Defenders of Wildlife and Wyoming Outdoor Council, the courts 
observed that while a deferred NEPA analysis would provide the Army 
Corps an opportunity to scrutinize an individual project’s cumulative 
effects, NEPA demands an analysis of the general permit’s cumulative 
effects.265 For example, if the Army Corps estimated that it would use 
NWP 12 to approve ten oil pipelines, it must analyze the cumulative 
effects of all ten before issuing the permit. Waiting for an oil company to 
propose one specific pipeline may make a cumulative effects analysis 
easier for that one pipeline. But it will not ease the Army Corps’s burden 
of analyzing the cumulative effects of all ten. “By their very nature, the 
‘cumulative impacts’ of a general permit cannot be evaluated in the 
context of approval of a single project.”266 
The same can be said of the Army Corps’s CWA analysis. The agency 
must ensure that the cumulative effects of all projects within the permit’s 
scope will minimally impact the environment. Conducting this analysis 
piece-by-piece in the context of individual projects is difficult—maybe 
impossible. Judge McHugh acknowledged that “accounting in advance 
for the broad range of possible impacts resulting from the wide variety of 
                                                     
263. See supra section III.A.2. 
264. See supra section IV.A. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 194–209. 
266. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1243 (D. Wyo. 
2005). 
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utility lines authorized under NWP 12 is a daunting task.”267 But she also 
noted that “compliance with NEPA is not excused simply because 
compliance is difficult.”268 The same could—indeed, should—be said for 
compliance with the CWA. 
The strong circuit precedent creates a substantial hurdle for 
environmental groups to overcome when arguing that deferral violates the 
CWA, but the groups should nevertheless challenge the Army Corps’s 
deferred CWA analysis. The groups should do so by challenging prior 
courts’ application of Chevron. As the window to prevent climate 
change’s worst effects closes,269 environmentalists must seek to revive the 
Ohio Valley district court’s analysis, which properly construes the CWA 
and leads to acceptable results based on sound reasoning. 
V. REISSUANCE OF NWP 12: THE ARMY CORPS ADDRESSES 
MANY, BUT NOT ALL, PROBLEMS 
The 2012 version of NWP 12 was set to expire on March 18, 2017,270 
as general permits expire every five years.271 However, on January 6, 
2017, the Army Corps reissued NWP 12 for another five years.272 As 
required, the agency conducted CWA and NEPA review before reissuing 
the general permit.273 NEPA review provided environmental groups an 
opportunity to comment on the reissuance. 
Armed with Judge McHugh’s concurrence, the groups commented that 
the Army Corps’s NEPA review was inadequate.274 However, the agency 
analyzed the cumulative effects of oil pipelines275 and did not limit its 
                                                     
267. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1066 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring). 
268. Id.  
269. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
270. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012).  
271. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (2012). 
272. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1,860, 1,860 (Jan. 6, 2017). The 
Trump administration exempted these permits from its early-2017 regulatory freeze. Justin Worland, 
President Trump Kept This One Obama Regulation Because It Makes Approving Pipelines Easier, 
TIME (Feb. 9, 2017), http://time.com/4665432/nationwide-permits-dakota-access-pipeline/ 
[http://perma.cc/9QQT-Z269]. For more information on the regulatory freeze, see Memorandum from 
Reince Priebus, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/memorandum-heads-
executive-departments-and-agencies [http://perma.cc/6ASY-TRCL]. 
273. See supra section I.C. 
274. NWP 12: Public Comments, supra note 112, at 19, 82–96. 
275. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT: NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, at 23 (2016) 
[hereinafter DECISION DOCUMENT 2016], http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/ 
nwp/2017/NWP_12_2017_final_Dec2016.pdf?ver=2017-01-06-125514-797 [http://perma.cc/TU54-
MLBC]. Its analysis assumed the agency would use NWP 12 “approximately 11,500 times per year 
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NEPA analysis to the aquatic environment, which it had done during the 
2012 reissuance.276 The Corps likely made this change because it was 
aware of Judge McHugh’s concurrence and the strong language from both 
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits calling its previous analysis into question.277 
These changes are a step in the right direction and likely preclude 
challenges based on the adequacy of the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis. 
However, the Army Corps’s changes did not preclude all potential 
challenges. Namely, environmental groups also brought attention to the 
improper deferral of CWA analysis during public comment on the 
reissuance of NWP 12278 and further argued that NEPA requires the Army 
Corps to provide opportunity for public comment during the verification 
stage of specific pipelines.279 The 2017 reissuance still allows the Corps 
to partially defer its CWA analysis. Specifically, the 2017 reissuance 
retained the requirement for pre-construction notice in specified situations 
because notice has “been effective in identifying proposed NWP 12 
activities that should be reviewed by district engineers on a case-by-case 
basis to ensure that they result in only minimal individual and cumulative 
adverse environmental effects.”280 Thus, the argument remains valid that 
the Army Corps should not review individual projects that fall within the 
scope of NWP 12 on a case-by-case basis.281 Instead, its CWA and NEPA 
analyses must be completed at the issuance stage.282 Environmental 
groups should challenge the next oil pipeline approved through the use of 
NWP 12. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental groups should challenge the current case law supporting 
the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 to approve domestic oil pipelines. 
Although the Army Corps recently strengthened its analysis of NWP 12 
to avoid future liability, the use of the general permit to approve domestic 
oil pipelines remains vulnerable to challenge in court. Specifically, 
                                                     
on a national basis, resulting in impacts to approximately 1,700 acres of waters.” Id. at 70. 
276. Compare U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT: NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, at 
23–28 (2012), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_12_2012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZHH8-ZURS] (limiting analysis to the aquatic environment), with DECISION 
DOCUMENT 2016, supra note 275, at 44–56 (2016) (broadening analysis to more than the aquatic 
environment). 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 227–30. 
278. NWP 12: Public Comments, supra note 112, at 19, 15–20. 
279. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1860, 1884 (Jan. 6, 2017). 
280. Id. at 1888. 
281. See supra Part IV. 
282. See supra Part IV. 
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environmentalists should urge courts to conduct a new Chevron analysis 
of CWA deferral without relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ohio 
Valley. The CWA is clear: the Army Corps may not partially defer its 
analysis of cumulative effects; instead, it must complete the analysis, 
along with its NEPA analysis, before issuing a general permit. Allowing 
deferral ignores the CWA’s plain meaning and inappropriately limits the 
public’s ability to comment as required by NEPA. If the Army Corps 
cannot prove minimal cumulative effects at the issuance stage, it may not 
issue a general permit and must individually permit projects instead. 
Judicial recognition of this argument will bring environmental review of 
oil pipelines into compliance with the CWA, strengthening review and 
improving the public’s ability to comment—a major win in the battle for 
a cleaner environment. 
 
